The Trouble with Evolutionary Psychology: Why We Deserve a Better Story
Thursday, February 27, 2025.
Evolutionary psychology (EP) is the field that insists every weird human behavior—from falling in love to overspending on throw pillows—can be explained by the survival strategies of our prehistoric ancestors.
It tells us that men hoard wealth because cavewomen loved mammoth hunters, and women prefer taller men because Neanderthal Chad had better rock-throwing skills.
It’s a compelling theory, and in fairness, EP does have its moments.
But too often, it veers into “just-so stories,” sloppy science, and some suspiciously convenient explanations for why the world is the way it is (and why we shouldn’t bother changing it).
More troublingly, it tends to treat humans less like self-aware souls and more like confused primates still fumbling through modern life with prehistoric instincts.
So, let’s take a closer look at the cracks in EP’s foundation—because humans deserve a better story.
Evolutionary Psychology’s Testability Problem: The Science of Never Being Wrong
Good science has to be falsifiable—that is, it must be possible to prove it wrong. Evolutionary psychology, however, has a superpower: it’s never wrong. No matter what the data says, EP finds a way to make the theory fit.
Take the claim that men evolved to prefer younger women because youth signals fertility.
This sounds reasonable until you notice societies where older women are considered more attractive due to their experience, power, or, let’s be honest, their ability to keep plants alive (Buss, 1989).
But don’t worry! EP has a backup explanation for that too: maybe men in those cultures have evolved to value resources and wisdom instead.
See the problem? No matter what happens, EP has an answer. And a theory that always has an answer, no matter the evidence, isn’t really a theory—it’s an improv show.
The Just-So Stories: Evolutionary Bedtime Tales for Adults
One of the biggest complaints about EP is its reliance on just-so stories—tidy little explanations for human behavior that sound plausible but lack real proof. These stories usually go something like this:
Men cheat more than women because prehistoric men needed to "spread their seed."
Women care more about emotional infidelity because they needed a devoted partner to protect them from saber-toothed tigers.
People hate public speaking because getting rejected by the tribe used to mean certain death.
Sure, these are fun theories. I’ve written many blog posts about them while vaguely complaining that we need a better story.
But these stories start to fall apart when you look at the messy reality of human behavior.
Plenty of women cheat.
Plenty of men care more about emotional security than casual sex.
And modern people aren’t terrified of public speaking because they think the audience will leave them to die in the wilderness—they’re just worried about looking dumb on the internet.
Even the Double-Shot Hypothesis (DeSteno & Salovey, 1996) suggests that gender differences in jealousy aren’t hardwired but rather the result of assumptions people make.
What is the double-shot hypothesis? Let’s posit that men might assume that if a woman is sexually unfaithful, she’s emotionally involved too (double the betrayal!). Women, on the other hand, might assume that if a man is emotionally unfaithful, he’s probably also sleeping around.
And then there’s the Imagination Hypothesis (Kato, 2014), which suggests that men and women respond differently to infidelity because men have more vivid sexual imagery while women have more vivid romantic imagery.
When researchers control for imagination levels, the supposed gender divide largely disappears.
In other words, when you start peeling back the layers, what looked like hardwired evolutionary behavior often turns out to be something else entirely.
The Forced-Choice Trick: How EP Gets the Answers It Wants
Many of EP’s strongest claims about gender differences come from forced-choice studies, where participants are asked to pick between two extreme options. A classic example is:
“Would you be more upset if your partner cheated on you sexually or emotionally?”
Men tend to choose “sexual,” women choose “emotional,” and EP researchers rush off to publish another paper about innate biological differences (Buss et al., 1992). I have to admit, I got suckered in by this one as well, because it “feels” right.
The problem?
Therapists must remember that forced-choice questions foster stark differences. Ouch. I should have looked closer.
In other words, when researchers use continuous rating scales, where participants can rate their distress on a sliding scale, gender differences shrink—or even disappear (Harris, 2003).
It’s like asking someone if they’d rather be set on fire or eaten by wolves, and then concluding that humans have an evolutionary preference for fire.
No, we just don’t like either option.
Cultural Narcissism: Why EP Tells Us Exactly What We Want to Hear
Here’s where things get interesting.
EP doesn’t just claim to explain human behavior—it also has a bad habit of reinforcing whatever cultural biases are already floating around. It’s less “we discovered this truth about humanity” and more “this is why you’re fine just the way you are.”
Men are naturally wired to seek multiple partners? Ah, so cheating isn’t his fault—it’s biology!
Women are evolutionarily predisposed to be caregivers? See, no need to rethink gender roles!
Capitalism is just survival of the fittest? No need for guilt—hoarding wealth is an evolutionary advantage!
By framing behavior as biologically inevitable, EP often excuses rather than explains. It turns cultural norms into scientific fact and tells us that whatever social structures we happen to have must be natural.
This was always my beef with EP; it’s utter lack of aspiration or nobility. I often found myself thinking, this doesn’t read as science—it’s seems like Cultural Narcissism, but with footnotes.
As evolutionary psychology (EP) grew in popularity, so too did the chorus of voices raising objections to its claims.
Some of these critics came from within psychology itself, but others emerged from disciplines as varied as anthropology, philosophy, sociology, and even feminist theory. Each brought a different concern to the table—concerns that, when put together, revealed the cracks in EP’s foundation.
The Cognitive Scientist Who Called EP an "Origins Myth"
One of the more famous critics of EP is Stephen Jay Gould, the evolutionary biologist and paleontologist, who argued that many of the field’s explanations were little more than just-so stories—narratives concocted after the fact to explain human behavior, rather than rigorously tested hypotheses (Gould, 2000).
He pointed out that some traits might be spandrels—byproducts of evolution rather than direct adaptations for survival. In other words, not every quirk of human psychology exists because it once helped our ancestors fend off saber-toothed tigers or secure mates.
In a similar vein, David Buller, a philosopher of science, took EP to task in his book Adapting Minds (2005), where he argued that much of what we think of as "evolutionary" behavior is actually culturally constructed and far more flexible than EP suggests.
He pointed out that many of the studies used to support EP were built on shaky methodological grounds, often ignoring historical and cross-cultural data that would complicate the "stone-age brain" model.
The Anthropologists Who Said, "Wait, Culture Exists"
Anthropologists have long been skeptical of EP’s tendency to treat human behavior as biologically determined while downplaying the influence of culture.
One of the most vocal critics from this camp is Marshall Sahlins, an anthropologist who argued that EP ignores the fact that culture itself is an evolutionary force!
Human beings don’t just inherit biological tendencies—we inherit ideas, institutions, and customs that shape behavior in ways EP often overlooks (Sahlins, 1976).
Another anthropologist, Sarah Hrdy, took issue with EP’s tendency to reinforce traditional gender roles under the guise of scientific objectivity.
Her work on primates revealed that female primates—contrary to EP’s assumptions about passive, nurturing mothers—can be aggressive, strategic, and sexually independent (Hrdy, 1999). If female primates in the wild don’t behave according to EP’s gender scripts, why should we assume that human gender roles are biologically hardwired?
The Feminist Scholars Who Saw EP as a Justification for the Status Quo
Feminist scholars have also been deeply critical of EP, particularly its treatment of gender differences.
Cordelia Fine, in her book Delusions of Gender (2010), meticulously dismantled many of EP’s claims about "innate" sex differences, showing how much of what we attribute to biology is actually the result of social conditioning and cultural expectations.
Fine didn’t just critique EP’s conclusions—she called out its methods, showing how subtle biases shape the way researchers design their studies and interpret their data. I still think she goes too far in calling gender a delusion, but her critique of Evolutionary Psychology is both brisk and pointed.
Similarly, Anne Fausto-Sterling, a biologist and gender studies scholar, argued that EP operates on an outdated, binary view of sex and gender that doesn’t reflect the biological reality of human diversity (Fausto-Sterling, 2000).
The idea that men evolved to be aggressive hunters while women evolved to be nurturing caregivers, she pointed out, ignores the sheer variety of ways that human societies have structured gender roles throughout history.
The Sociologists Who Saw Through the "Natural" Justifications
Sociologists have long pointed out that EP’s narratives often align suspiciously well with whatever social norms are currently dominant.
Pierre Bourdieu, a sociologist who studied power and social structures, argued that many of the behaviors EP claims are "natural" are actually the result of social conditioning and power dynamics (Bourdieu, 1984).
When EP suggests that men evolved to dominate and women evolved to submit, it conveniently supports existing gender hierarchies rather than questioning them.
In more recent years, Melvin Konner, an anthropologist and neuroscientist, has argued that human behavior is too plastic and adaptable to fit into EP’s rigid evolutionary framework.
His work emphasizes that humans have evolved to be flexible, capable of learning and reshaping their behavior to fit different social and environmental conditions (Konner, 2010). In other words, the whole premise of a "stone-age brain trapped in a modern world" might be misleading—we’ve been adapting all along.
The Philosophers Who Saw the Limits of the Evolutionary Lens
Even philosophers have weighed in on the EP debate.
David J. Buller, a philosopher of science, has been particularly vocal about EP’s tendency to cherry-pick data to fit its assumptions. He argues that EP fails to take into account the historical and cultural variability of human behavior—something that any robust theory of psychology should consider (Buller, 2005).
Similarly, John Dupré, a philosopher of science, has critiqued EP for its deterministic outlook.
He argues that human behavior is shaped by multiple interacting factors, including culture, history, and individual agency, and that EP oversimplifies this complexity by attributing everything to biological adaptation (Dupré, 2001).
The Dignity Problem: Why Evolutionary Psychology Reduces Us to Clever Apes
Perhaps the biggest issue with EP is that it treats humans as elaborate biological machines, driven only by reproductive instincts and leftover survival strategies.
Love? Just mate selection. Altruism? A genetic strategy. Your entire moral compass? Probably a way to ensure your genes make it to the next generation.
While there’s no doubt that biology influences our behavior, EP often subordinates the role of culture, personal choice, and human growth. It tells us that we are little more than cavemen in suits, still acting out prehistoric scripts.
But human beings are different. We can reflect on our actions. We can change. We can choose to act against our instincts. We can create meaning beyond survival and reproduction.
If your theory of human nature doesn’t leave room for things like art, self-sacrifice, and really good poetry, then maybe it’s missing something.
We Deserve a Better Story
What all these critics share is a belief that human behavior cannot be reduced to a simple set of evolutionary adaptations. While EP provides some interesting insights, its tendency to oversimplify, ignore cultural influences, and justify existing social structures renders it an increasingly flawed model.
As research progresses, many scholars are moving toward a more integrated approach that combines biology, culture, psychology, and social structures to explain human behavior.
This emerging perspective—sometimes called biocultural evolution—acknowledges that humans are shaped by their evolutionary past, but also by their cultures, institutions, and personal choices.
What is biocultural evolution? Instead of treating human behavior as a set of instinctual, predetermined responses, biocultural evolution sees humans as adaptable, creative, and capable of transcending biological imperatives.
And that, in the end, is a far more compelling and hopeful story than the one evolutionary psychology tries to tell.
In other words, we are complicated, messy, and constantly evolving.
Yes, we are shaped by our biology, but we are also shaped by our choices, our cultures, and our ongoing ability to redefine ourselves.
We deserve a theory of human behavior that acknowledges both where we come from and where we have the power to go.
And let’s leave the savanna behind once and for all.
Be Well, Stay Kind, and Godspeed.
REFERENCES:
Buss, D. M. (1989). Sex differences in human mate preferences: Evolutionary hypotheses tested in 37 cultures. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 12(1), 1-49.
Buss, D. M., Larsen, R. J., Westen, D., & Semmelroth, J. (1992). Sex differences in jealousy: Evolution, physiology, and psychology. Psychological Science, 3(4), 251-255.
DeSteno, D., & Salovey, P. (1996). Evolutionary explanations of jealousy: A double-shot hypothesis. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 70(6), 1152-1165.
Harris, C. R. (2003). A review of sex differences in sexual jealousy and infidelity responses. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 7(2), 102-128.
Kato, H. (2014). The role of imagination in infidelity-related emotions. Japanese Psychological Research, 56(1), 57-65.
Schmitt, D. P. (2005). Sociosexuality from Argentina to Zimbabwe: A 48-nation study. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 89(5), 824-845.